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Monistic and Dualistic Paths
t o Radical Secularism:
Comments on Tushnet
Ralph C. Hancock*
Parts of Mark Tushnet's essay might provide a useful
corrective to what he calls a "sky is falling"' response to the
already infamous Smith2 decision. It is well to be reminded
that religious claims were more often denied than honored
under the Supreme Court's "compelling state interest
d~ctrine,"~
and that religious interests are not entirely without
legal resources ("various statutory and state constitutional
ground^")^ under the new regime. More fundamentally,
Tushnet reminds us of the illusory character of any tidy legal
separation between political and religious interests or purposes.
To maintain boundaries between the state and religion,
someone (presumably the Supreme Court, conditioned by its
sense of the "mainstream" of public opinion) must in the end
decide what qualifies as a "compelling state interest," and
indeed what qualifies as "religion."
One might conclude from such observations that respect for
these boundaries from the political side must ultimately
depend, not upon some tidy legal dichotomy between "secular"
and "religious," but upon a general public respect for religion or
for the purposes served by religion. An inevitable corollary of
* Associate F'rofessor of Political Science, Brigham Young University. Professor
Hancock chaired a panel discussion on "Religious Liberty in a Postmodern Age" for
the Symposium on New Directions in Religious Liberty, Jan. 22-23, 1993, in which
Professor Tushnet delivered his paper, infra note 1.
1. Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV.
117, 118.
2.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U S . 872 (1990).
3.
See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 1, a t 122.
4.
Id. at 123.
5.
See Tushnet's discussion of the "three levels of free exercise law," id. a t
134.
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this view-as the founders of Brigham Young University
learned the hard way-is that public respect tends to be
limited to the conventionally respectable.
But these are not Tushnet's conclusions, and his aim is
certainly not to contribute to the security or scope of religious
freedom by broadening or informing the public's respect for
religion. For this would require an articulation of some sense of
the meaning of "religious" ends as at once distinct from secular
purposes and as legitimate objects of public protectiod But
Tushnet is determined not to know what religion is.

For Tush.net, religion is always becoming, always in
process. Religion has no stable meaning, and so we can never
maintain that religion has been compromised or subjugated. A
religion may seem t o have succumbed to external, secular
pressure, but this appearance vanishes when we understand
that no ground exists for the distinction between the religious
and the secular. The very definition of "religion," or of any
particular religion, is a matter of ongoing "dialogue7' and
"negotiation" between or among historical forces. From this
point of view, the very concept of coercion vanishes, for there is
no-thing to coerce; the legitimacy of power cannot be judged
from the standpoint of any stable religious commitments. State
coercion is on the same plane with social pressure, and each is
as entitled as any other force-factor to contribute to the ongoing
redefinition of "religion," to the "dialogue" and "negotiation"
through which religion is ever becoming.
Is religion becoming better? Consistent with his historical
relativism, Tush.net claims he is unable to pass judgment on
this matter. Indeed, the question only makes sense in his
framework as a question about how religion or a religion at
some future point in the endless flux of dialogic or negotiated
development might evaluate an earlier point in this process.
Tush.net insists that he takes "no position on the authenticity
of either Georgetown's pre- or post-litigation interpretation of
what its religious commitments require."' But this pose is not
6. This is no easy task, but Tocqueville has provided a model of how the
argument, political but not utilitarian, neither dogmatic nor relativistic, might be
developed. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA (J.P.
Mayer ed. & George Lawrence trans., 1969).
Tushnet, supra note 1, at 133 n.37.
7.
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convincing. A theory which reduces religion to the successive
and contingent products of political bargaining or to the
outcome of a blind interaction of social forces can hardly claim
to do justice to, o r even give respect to, a religion's claim to
represent (however imperfectly) a permanent and transcendent
truth. If freedom of religion is merely the freedom of another
"interest group," then there is no point in calling it freedom of
religion. (Moreover, in a political arena conceived as a contest
of force-factors where nothing is sacred, there may be cause t o
worry about the viability of any freedom.) Tushnet invites
religion to a supposedly fair fight, where all that is distinctive
in religion must be left at the door, and all remaining weapons
can only be taken up in the name of secular interests.
In any case, Tushnet does not work very hard at
sustaining this pose of impartiality, but clearly tips his hand in
a number of passages. Thus he seems to take for granted that
being forced t o negotiate with secular interests can bring a
religion to understand what its "commitments really are . . . .
[Sluch efforts will enhance the institution's religious
commitments through clarification of those commitment^."^
Although religion is a process of negotiation and dialogue, it is
apparently possible for the "Enlightened" t o discern when that
process is moving in the right direction (clarifying "real"
commitments), and when it is not (clinging t o old-fashioned
ideas of morality as anchored in transcendent truth). Tushnet's
feigned impartiality t o the outcome of struggles t o define a
particular religion's commitments (e.g., the Catholic church's
position on the status of homosexuality) is a very thin mask for
his promotion of a liberationist viewpoint. Pretending not t o
notice that contemporary efforts to "redefine" religious
commitments have a persistent common theme-the attack on
traditional moral restraints-he is puzzled as to "why the
outsider's perspective is relevant.'*
This question may be framed more bluntly: Why should
Mormons care about how Catholicism-or a certain jurisdiction
of Catholicism-redefines itself? The plain answer is that
Mormons, Catholics, and many others have a common interest
in resisting government-sponsored encroachments into their
institutions and ways of life by a radically secular, liberationist
antiethic. Within the horizon of Tushnet's reduction of religion
8.
9.

Id. at 131.
Id.at132.
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to the negotiated or coerced transvaluation of values, the
verdict of history is not hard to read in advance. If his
collapsing of truth with negotiation and even coercion prevails,
then it will obviously be impossible to regard Georgetown's new
mere
accommodation of homosexuals as "unauthentic-a
submission t o coercive state pre~sure."'~The alternativeTushnet's real view, the view from the perspective of our
liberated future-is "that we will see the old position as
unauthentic-resting on a thoughtless failure to consider the
implications of the church's fundamental commitments and
faith when approaching problems that were unforeseen by
those who formulated the old position. . . . a thoughtless
adherence to a mindless tradition."" For Tushnet, any belief
that does not understand itself as the contingent result of blind
social or political forces can only be regarded as irrational or
"thoughtless."

For any thoughtless people who may not have been
sufficiently reassured by Tushnet's monistic reduction of
religion t o a process of secular evolution, he goes on to supply a
defense of Smith in the language of radical dualism. On this
view, the religious and the secular are seen as "two domains of
life that ought to be kept separate."lz Relying upon "[olne
reading of James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance,"
Tushnet defends Smith as consistent with Madison's
"sectarian" argument that "[tlhe religion . . . of every man must
be left t o the conviction and conscience of every man."13 Smith
puts an end to the "id~latry"'~of the "compelling state
interest" regime, in which secular judges presumed t o decide
what was essential t o a religion. Tushnet's dualism is
considerably less friendly to religion than Madison's, simply
because Madison conceived of the legitimate scope of
government as rather severely restricted by individual rights,
whereas Tushnet construes rights in such a way as to invite
the indefinite expansion of the scope of government. Thus, the

10. Id. at 133.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 136.
13. Id. (quoting JAMES MADISON, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: A MEMORIAL AND
REMONSTRANCE5 (Lincoln & Edmonds 1819)).
14. Id. at 137-38.
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good news for believers is not that free exercise will be
respected, but that it will be violated on nonreligious grounds!
Here Tushnet's argument is impossible to parody, and it is
difficult t o believe that he intends it t o be taken seriously by
believers in institutional religion. Perhaps he finds it hard t o
conceive that any such "thoughtless" people still exist, at least
among his audience of legal scholars. Tushnet proposes that
believers be content to acknowledge the power of secular
government to regulate religious institutions in any way it
likes, as long as this power is not confused with religious
authority.15 Tushnet fearlessly (or heedlessly) pursues this
argument t o its conclusion: if Smith results in the persecution
of religion, then this persecution may serve t o remind the
religious that the territory of the state must ever be distinct
from the territory of God? Persecution purifies religion, and
Tushnet's state is ready to help.
Here we begin to see that Tushnet's monistic argument
(religion is a dimension of the historical process) and his
dualistic argument (religion and politics are radically distinct
realms) are actually two sides of a single, progressiveliberationist coin. The privatization of religion, taken to the
extreme, leaves the believer without any c o ~ e c t i o nwith
publicly acknowledged meanings; the transcendent to which
private "conscience" appeals is divorced from the communal
human reality in which the person lives and breathes. Any
substance of private belief thus appears groundless and
evanescent; the only stable content of belief is a belief in
progress, which can only be defined negatively as the liberation
from thoughtless restraints. This is the effectual truth of
Tushnet's reduction of religion to the condition of being "at
risk."17

IV. CONCLUSION
It would be wrong to give Tushnet credit or blame for
originality in this mobilization of Christian dualism in the
service of secular progress. It has been three hundred years
since Locke called Christianity's bluff: 'Your Kingdom is not of
this world? F i n e y o u have the 'other world,' we'll take this

15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id. at 139.
Id.
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one."18 And, although it would be hasty to make Locke, or
even a Lockean Madison and Jefferson, the sole authors of the
American understanding of religious freedom, there is no point
in denying that Locke's argument played a role in the genesis
of the First Amendment. But this implies all the more reason
for friends of religious freedom today to reconsider the
implications of such a radicalization of religious dualism. When
Christ said, "render unto Caesar," he surely did not mean to
authorize everything a modern, progressive Caesar might
command to "render unto Me."
Tush.net helps friends of religious freedom to see that, in
facing the challenge of contemporary secularism, they can no
longer rest content with the Jeffersonian belief, perhaps
inherited or appropriated from the spirit of Protestant
Christianity, that "the mind is made free." No doubt in some
eternal sense this is true. But if freedom is to mean something
other than the "liberation" of bodily appetites or formless (if
ultimately conformist) "self-expression," then our children will
need religious institutions to prepare them to understand such
higher meanings. Thus, we can no longer take for granted what
was often only silently assumed by the Founders of our
religious freedom: that the defense of such freedom implies a
common and public recognition, not of any particular
orthodoxy, but of the real ethical difference between higher and
lower.

18.
See John Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration, reprinted in MARTO
MONTORUI,
JOHN~ C K EON TOLERATION
AND THE UNITYOF GOD 7 (1983); Ralph
C. Hancock, Religion and the Limits of Limited Government, 50 REV. POL. 682,
683-84 (1988).

